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ABSTRACT: However the term “culture” is defined, a culture becomes an argument culture when it is 
characterized by consciousness of audience, comfort with uncertainty, expectation of personal convictions, 
commitment to justification rather than formal proof, realization that the enterprise is essentially 
cooperative, and willingness to assume risks. Such a culture productively negotiates tensions between 
contingency and commitment, partisanship and restraint, personal conviction and sensitivity to audience, 
reasonableness and subjectivity, decision and nonclosure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It may have taken some courage for the organizing committee to pick as this year’s 
conference theme “argument cultures.” If the word got out, to many people in North 
America this phrase would be likely to conjure up the title of a book published a few 
years ago by the popular U.S. linguist Deborah Tannen (Tannen 1998). Her earlier book 
claimed to explain why men and women do not understand each other. Having addressed 
that issue, in The Argument Culture she bemoans a society she finds full of people too 
quick to take offense, too impatient, too insensitive to others. Contemporary U.S. culture, 
she maintains, is characterized by whining, bickering, complaining, griping, quarreling—
or, in other words, by argument. For Tannen, argument is a pathology, and the way to a 
better life lies in diminishing its role. 
 Such are the vagaries of the English language—unlike many other tongues—that 
the words “argument,” “arguing,” and “argumentation” have two very distinct 
connotations. There is the popular negative connotation embodied in Tannen’s work and 
in the looks of people who sometimes ask me, incredulously, “You mean you teach 
that?” This, I can safely assert, is not our focus. Then there is a second connotation, 
which animates our work. We are not all philosophers (though I have been accused of 
much worse), but we do all believe that the relationships among claims, reasons, and 
people offer material for serious study. We are committed to understand and improve the 
processes by which people seek to warrant their own beliefs and, through giving and 
exchanging reasons, to influence the thought and action of others. And our conference 
theme directs our attention to these activities within the framework of culture. 
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 The term “culture” focuses our attention not on arguments as sets of disembodied 
propositions but on what people make and do when they argue. In the most general sense, 
a culture designates a body of norms and practices, and the people who engage in them, 
that are sustained across time. But the scope of the term “culture” is wonderfully 
ambiguous. It sometimes is understood in reference to a nation, as when we talk about 
French culture or American culture. Sometimes it refers to the organization of academic 
fields, as when we mention the cultures of philosophy or communication programs. 
Sometimes the reference is ethnic or religious, as in Slavic cultures, Muslim cultures, or 
Latino cultures. Sometimes what is meant is a particular viewpoint or focus, as in visual 
culture or postmodern culture. Sometimes general modes of inquiry are suggested by the 
term, as when we talk about artistic, scientific, humanistic, or professional cultures. In 
each of these cases, and many others besides, the cultural point of reference conditions 
how arguments are designed, practiced, understood, and evaluated. In this sense each of 
my examples could be thought of as a distinct argument culture. 
 But that is not my approach this morning. I wish to bracket the question of what 
constitutes a culture and ask instead, for any understanding of culture, what happens 
when it becomes an argument culture—that is, a culture that values and encourages 
argumentation. I am assuming that no culture is an argument culture all the time. 
Sometimes it will have more urgent needs than encouraging reason-giving. But when a 
culture becomes an argument culture, what does it look like?  What are the characteristics 
of an argument culture, and what are its predicaments? 
 At the risk of being too elementary, I would like to speculate about these 
questions. I will take disagreement between people as the paradigm case of argumentative 
exchange, but my remarks also apply to other argument configurations. The heart of my 
remarks will take the form of two lists—one, a set of six characteristics that I think an 
argument culture will possess, and the other, a series of five tensions that an argument 
culture negotiates. Let me begin, then, with six features that identify an argument culture. 
 
2. IDENTIFYING AN ARGUMENT CULTURE 
 
First, an argument culture assumes the presence of an audience and emphasizes its 
importance. Argument forms can be elegant models whether they relate to anyone or not, 
but a culture implies connections among people. Arguments are addressed to people. The 
audience can be one person, as in the case of a dialectical encounter, or a small group 
engaged in deliberation. The audience even can be the same as the arguer, as in the 
classic dialogue between self and soul. But it also can be the third-party observers of a 
legislative or judicial hearing, or even a mass public attending to mediated messages, or 
an audience evoked by the arguer and inferred from the text. 
 One function of the audience is to establish the boundaries of acceptable 
argumentative practice. It is well and good to posit normative standards a priori, but the 
standards that really matter are the ones that the audience imposes in a given 
circumstance, constraining or directing the arguers. To use a simple example, the 
presence of two contradictory arguments means logically only that they cannot both be 
true. But those attuned to audience-centered argumentation will recognize that people 
often regard both of the inconsistent claims as unacceptable, because the contradiction 
calls into question the sincerity and trustworthiness of the arguer. In this case, the 
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audience-based standard is more demanding than is a formal standard; in others, it can be 
less so. In all cases, though, the particulars matter. This finding encourages our concern 
with what rhetoricians would call the rhetorical situation, what informal logicians would 
call the context, what pragma-dialecticians would call the activity type. Simply put, in an 
argument culture, practice begins in awareness of the specific circumstances of the case 
and of the constraints and opportunities it presents. 
 Relating arguments to audiences is a concern of the argumentation scholar and 
critic as well as of the arguer. For example, in the U.S. the Federalist Papers often are 
understood as an exercise in political philosophy, setting forth a particular perspective on 
the nature of a constitutional republic. In fact, though, they were written with specific 
assumptions of the beliefs and values animating delegates to the New York state ratifying 
convention, in an attempt to influence their votes (Eubanks 1989, pp. 314-15).1 I believe 
that we will understand these great documents much more richly when we examine their 
arguments as responses to a particular situation. Similarly, one can read the Lincoln-
Douglas debates as abstract discussion of the morality of slavery and be offended by the 
seeming tentativeness of Lincoln’s antislavery commitment. But one can read them 
instead with an understanding of a lay audience to whom they were directed: the Old Line 
Whigs of central Illinois who were both antislavery and anti-abolition, and whose votes 
would decide the election (Zarefsky 1990, pp. 1-39). Realizing that audience beliefs and 
values constrained them helps one to see more clearly the strategic and tactical artistry of 
Lincoln and Douglas as they pushed the envelope. In constructing their arguments, each 
sought to exploit one set of the audience’s commitments to position himself as moderate 
and his opponent as extreme. 
 The audience consists of those people the arguer wants to influence (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 19), and they may or may not be those actually present. In 
any case, in an argument culture arguers take their audiences seriously and the 
argumentation takes place with an audience in mind.     
Second, an argument culture acknowledges and may even embrace uncertainty. It 
was Aristotle who wrote (in Rhetoric 1357a) that on matters that are certain, no one 
deliberates. Why should they, when they can discover knowledge or resolve 
disagreements by far more efficient means? Of course, not much is “certain.” Even our 
knowledge of the external world is mediated by our own perception, and what seems 
certain has that status only in the sense that it is universally accepted. But when direct 
perception or appeal to a mutually accepted authority can resolve a disagreement or 
answer a question, there is no reason to argue about the matter. 
 In contrast, matters that are uncertain are potentially controversial; they always 
could be otherwise. However strongly we may believe about them, we cannot know for 
sure. Argumentation, then, is characterized by the existence of opposing viewpoints, and 
an argument culture is one that valorizes dissensus rather than seeking either to ignore or 
to squelch disagreements (see Goodnight 1991, pp. 1-13). Continuing the discussion is a 
higher priority than is achieving an artificial settlement. Some conflicts can be resolved; 
others can only be clarified. But argumentation can be productive in either case.  
 This being so, in an argument culture people respect one another regardless of the 
beliefs they espouse. Disagreements take place over standpoints, not individuals. Any 
                                                 
1 Eubanks concludes, however, that the Papers were less significant than one might think, because the 
argumentation was not adapted well enough to the audience.  
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arguer deserves respect for contributing to the conversation, not disdain for prolonging it. 
(In turn, each person has an obligation genuinely to contribute, not merely to rehash or to 
distract.)   
 Third, an argument culture is one that, even in the face of uncertainty, values 
conviction. To put it another way, individuals do not wallow in uncertainty, indifferent to 
choices and content to follow the path of least resistance. Nor are they paralyzed by the 
inability to decide conclusively. On the contrary, they argue both to form and to test their 
beliefs. They do the former through problem-solving discussions; the latter, through 
dialogue, disputation, and debate. Even when people have beliefs so strong that they think 
they know for sure, like the Minnesota high school students who wrote me that everyone 
knows that human life begins at conception and abortion is chosen only for convenience, 
still they test their beliefs by submitting them to the scrutiny others will offer through 
argument. To be challenged is not a sign of weakness, nor is answering a challenge a sign 
that the challenge was unfounded.  
 What sustains convictions on this view is not prejudice or closed-mindedness, not 
reaffirmation of cant or dogma, but the fact that the convictions have withstood 
meaningful testing through argument. What leads one to change convictions is not force 
or seduction, not indifference or withering in the face of a challenge, but 
acknowledgment that the original position could not withstand testing through argument. 
And arguers do not adhere to convictions forever and always, but only until they are 
given good reason to change. Precisely because uncertain matters always could be 
otherwise, in an argument culture there are commitments to positions but there are no 
final victories. 
 Fourth, an argument culture embraces the process of justifying, rather than 
proving, one’s claims. Because matters are uncertain, there is an inferential leap between 
one’s premises and one’s conclusions. Argumentation recognizes this leap and offers 
reasons for making it (Brockriede 1975, pp. 179-182). The reasons are acceptable if they 
would convince a reasonable person who was exercising critical judgment. If so, we may 
say that the claim has been justified. The more critical the “critical” listener, who assents 
to the argument, the more confident the arguer can be that his or her claim is sound.  
Justification, then, is subjective and is dependent upon the particular audience. It 
says not that something is true but rather that a person should believe it. What is 
“justified” is commitment to a position or standpoint, not certification of its truth. In 
emphasizing justification rather than proof, an argument culture implies that people are 
open-minded and willing to be convinced without the assurance of truth, yet sceptical 
enough not to take statements just on faith. Moreover, justification has degrees of 
strength, ranging from the merely plausible to the highly probable, and the strength 
attributed to the argument will vary accordingly. 
 What counts as justification—the sorts of evidence and reasoning structures that 
will be convincing—will depend on the context, including such factors as the importance 
of the issue to the participants, the status the arguers have in the controversy, and the 
possibility of reversing course if the justification is found to be in error. The meaning and 
importance of justification remain constant, but the criteria for and strength of 
justification are context-specific. This is similar to the distinction Toulmin draws between 
field-invariant standards and field-dependent criteria (Toulmin 1958, pp. 15, 30). 
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 Fifth, an argument culture is one in which, despite its seemingly adversarial 
character, argumentation is fundamentally a cooperative enterprise. This feature directly 
counters the image of arguing as bickering, quarreling, or eristic disputation. It 
distinguishes the culture that distains or merely tolerates argument from the culture that 
valorizes and extols it (see Ehninger 1970, pp. 101-110). 
 If the popular image of argumentation is that it is sublimated fighting, in what 
sense can it be said to be at all cooperative? In an ideal argumentative encounter, the 
arguers share a common goal of reaching the best possible decision under the 
circumstances. The seemingly adversarial elements of argumentation—attack and 
defense, refutation and rebuttal—are means toward the achievement of this common goal. 
It is as though an intelligent designer (pardon the reference) had assigned the arguers to 
play the role of committed advocates for opposing positions, so that the proposition or 
standpoint under examination would receive a particularly rigorous test. A standpoint that 
survives such careful scrutiny is more likely to warrant our trust than one that does not.  
 But, of course, actual cases of argumentation fall far short of this ideal. 
Competing arguers may be interested in the best decision, but they believe they already 
know what it is and want for their view to prevail.2 But these harsh factors do not negate 
the beauty of the common goal. Committed advocates, sure that they are right, will be 
induced to develop the strongest case for their position because they know their views 
will be examined by equally committed advocates for the opposing view. They owe it to 
the seeming truth of their position to give it their best case. Just as if there were an 
“invisible hand” (again, pardon the reference) guiding the process, standpoints will be 
tested rigorously, and the decision-maker—in this case, probably a third party, since the 
arguers themselves will be at an impasse—will be enabled to make the best decision 
under the circumstances. 
 Beyond their common goal, arguers will cooperate in other respects too. They will 
agree on the starting points of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, p. 
35). These will include procedural conventions such as turn-taking, reciprocal obligations 
such as the need to support claims when challenged and responsibility to take objections 
into account rather than merely repeating the initial position, norms such as what counts 
as evidence, meanings of the key terms and concepts in the discussion, and values such as 
modesty, respect for the audience, and respect for one’s interlocutor. These agreements 
are often tacit, but they can be made explicit when questioned. An argument culture is 
one characterized by these levels of cooperation and by the recognition that seemingly 
adversarial disputation has the positive function of facilitating decisions of good quality, 
whether by consensus of the arguers or by the judgment of a third party. 
 Sixth and finally, an argument culture is one in which individuals are willing to 
take risks. Any arguer accepts two principal risks (see Johnstone 1965, pp. 1-9, esp. p. 3). 
One is the risk of being shown to be wrong and needing, therefore, to alter one’s system 
of beliefs, attitudes, or values. Cognitive change of this sort can be unsettling, and the 
                                                 
2 This is the central idea behind the program of “strategic maneuvering” developed by van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser 2002, pp. 131-159. Given the objectives of their program, however, van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser stipulate that the strategic moves are subordinate to the dialectical goal of resolving 
disagreement. Not all approaches to argumentation would share that view. The position here is that in an 
argument culture, whether arguers are committed to cooperative action or not, their argumentative behavior 
serves a cooperative goal similar to that specified by van Eemeren and Houtlosser. 
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more so when one’s fundamental convictions are at issue. The second is the risk of loss of 
face among relevant others as a result of unsuccessful argumentative performance. This 
can be threatening to a person’s self-esteem and sense of worth. If a person knew, for 
sure, that he or she was right, that person might be unwilling to take these risks. And each 
of us probably has some aspects of our lives about which we will not argue, just as some 
historians will not engage with those who deny the existence of the Holocaust or other 
generally accepted facts, and some scientists will not argue with those who deny 
generally accepted scientific theories such as evolution. 
 But an argument culture is one in which these zones of exclusion are relatively 
small. Arguers believe that they are right, but they do not know for sure. They will 
strengthen their confidence if they can gain the assent of valued others, but only if assent 
is freely given. For the sake of free assent, they will place their own convictions on the 
table so that they can be examined by others, and while seeking to convince their 
antagonists, they run the risk that they will be convinced instead. In Henry Johnstone’s 
view, they bestow human dignity and person on their interlocutor, and thereby claim the 
same values for themselves (Johnstone 1965, p. 9; Johnstone 1970, p. 150).  
 So far I have suggested that an argument culture can be characterized by six 
attributes:  consciousness of audience, comfort with uncertainty, expectation of personal 
convictions, commitment to justification rather than formal proof, realization that the 
enterprise is essentially cooperative, and willingness to assume risks. I am not yet 
prepared to say that these are necessary or sufficient conditions for an argument culture, 
but I do think that they are general descriptions of such a culture. 
 
3. MANAGING TENSIONS IN AN ARGUMENT CULTURE 
 
It may occur to you that some of these characteristics are at cross purposes, if not 
inconsistent. Indeed, I believe that argument cultures exist in productive tension among 
these characteristics. This is also why there are no final victories in argumentation, 
seemingly settled questions can be reopened, and today’s minority view can prevail 
another day. 
 What then are some of these productive tensions? At the risk of burdening you 
with another list, let me briefly suggest five. 
 One is the tension between contingency and commitment, between accepting the 
uncertainty of the situation and committing oneself to standpoints one is prepared to 
defend. In an argument culture, people make commitments in the face of contingency, 
and at the same time contingency makes them just a bit sceptical about their own 
commitments. This tension prevents the culture both from wallowing in Hamlet-like 
indecision and from degenerating into a culture of closed-minded true-believers. 
 A second tension is between partisanship and restraint. Arguers are partisans for 
the cause they espouse. Except perhaps in interscholastic debate contests in which the 
goal is to develop argument skills for their own sake, arguers sincerely want their position 
to prevail and believe that real consequences are at stake. Yet they are not willing to use 
any and all means to achieve that end. They forego force and bribery, for example—not 
just because of fear of failure but also because assent under those conditions would not be 
worth having. President Kennedy referred to nuclear war as one in which even the fruits 
of victory would be ashes in our mouth (Kennedy 1963, p. 807). At a less cosmic level, 
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arguers are saying in effect that unrestrained partisanship would produce the same result, 
a victory that is not worth having. An argument culture recognizes that the posture of 
restrained partisanship will best protect the culture over the long haul. 
 A third tension is between personal conviction and sensitivity to audience. An 
arguer seeks the assent of an audience and therefore will tailor his or her argument 
choices to the expectations and beliefs of the audience. But the arguer will not go to the 
extreme of pandering to the audience, telling it whatever it wishes to hear at the cost of 
fidelity to his or her own convictions. An argument culture will penalize a person who is 
thought willing to say anything that will help his or her cause; such a person is disparaged 
as a “flip-flopper.” In a seminal essay over fifty years ago, Donald Bryant described the 
function of rhetoric as “adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas.” (Bryant 1953, pp. 
401-424). Much the same could be said about argumentation, in the sense that arguers 
both adapt their ideas so that they will be palatable to the audience and also try to move 
the audience to acceptance of their ideas. In the process, both audience and ideas are 
changed somehow, and to that degree a new social world is created. 
 A fourth tension is between reasonableness and subjectivity. Arguments are 
reasonable if they would be generally acceptable on their face by people exercising their 
critical judgment. People exercise such judgments in what may be highly subjective and 
idiosyncratic ways, preferring this or that value, giving different weight to this or that 
criterion, bestowing this or that interpretation on facts or evidence. Every one of these 
different criteria for choices may be individual and subjective, yet their accumulation in 
the form of acceptance is what makes an argument reasonable. An argument culture will 
embrace this tension; its ideology will be less visible and more complex than one which 
does not.  
 A fifth and final tension is between decision and nonclosure. If I have sounded 
any consistent note in these remarks, it is that there are no final victories; continuing the 
conversation is valuable in itself. An argument culture sustains itself by not closing off 
argument. And yet arguments do end; things do need to get decided. In the United States, 
for example, albeit at great cost we have decided that slavery and officially sanctioned 
racial discrimination are wrong. I do not expect those questions to be reopened. And yet 
even there, underlying arguments remain open: once we have committed ourselves to 
equality, what does that mean and how far does our commitment go? These are questions 
underlying controversies on affirmative action, reparations, education policy, and the 
significance of the election of Barack Obama. An argument culture embraces the tension 
between decision and nonclosure, recognizing the need to settle certain matters while at 
the same time keeping the conversation open lest standpoints harden into dogma. 
Disputes settled on one level may mutate on another. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
To this point I have speculated about six characteristics of an argument culture and five 
tensions such a culture exploits. What, finally, is the status of these speculations?  Have I 
described a counterfactual normative ideal, or are there actually argument cultures as I 
have imagined them? The answer is yes, some of each. My notion of argument culture is 
something like the universal audience, the ideal speech situation, or the critical discussion 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, pp. 31-35; McCarthy 1978, p. 308; van Eemeren 
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and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 21-23). The sense that it is a goal toward which we should 
strive but usually fall short. But it also is a state that sometimes is actually achieved, or at 
least approximated, by cultures of many different types—not always, of course, but when 
their discourse is at its best. National cultures become argument cultures when they are 
self-reflective and especially when they can understand the basis of claims advanced by 
others. Disciplinary cultures—not excluding our own disciples of logic, dialectic, and 
rhetoric—become argument cultures when they move beyond self-serving proclamations 
about who works for whom and instead focus on the consequences of both their 
differences and their similarities, and on the justification for their methods. 
 Lest I leave this question in the abstract, I would like to close by briefly 
identifying moments at which political discourse in the United States—what I tend most 
to study—took on many of the characteristics of an argument culture. One occurred in the 
late 18th century, when the states and the people considered whether to ratify the 
proposed Constitution. The discourse in the state ratifying conventions reflected 
cognizance of the audience, justification for positions taken, the acceptance of risks, the 
competing demands of contingency and commitment, and—despite the sometimes 
excessive passion or hyperbole—the shared goal of framing the best government for the 
new nation (see The Debate on the Constitution 1993). One who studies the ratification 
debates, I believe, will notice the prominence of argument in the evolution of the 
controversy. 
 Another, perhaps surprisingly, took place in the mid-19th century, as advocates 
grappled with the moral, legal, and political problems posed by American slavery. With 
the benefit of hindsight, we may see the coming of the Civil War as inevitable, but it 
certainly did not seem so to most people ate the time. For most of the 1850’s, people of 
good will exchanged arguments about who was qualified to settle the issue, what avenues 
of compromise might be available, and whether there was a way in which the issue could 
be outgrown or a decision postponed. It was not until the symbolic violence of the late 
1850’s—the sack of Lawrence, Kansas, the attack on Senator Charles Sumner, and John 
Brown’s raid—that people first despaired of settling the issue through argument.  
 I have less confidence in identifying contemporary moments when U.S. civic 
discourse has become an argument culture. One probably was the period leading up to the 
first Persian Gulf War, when the nation argued about the comparative merits of military 
action and of giving United Nations sanctions more time to work. Another may have been 
the period of 1967-68 when an extended national argument led many Americans to 
reassess their beliefs about the Vietnam War. Yet another might be the national 
discussion after the disputed Presidential elections of 2000, when people learned about 
arcane elements of the Constitution and remained patient and calm, even while media 
commentators proclaimed that the nation was facing a crisis and that decisions must be 
made without the luxury of argumentation. 
 My point is that at moments like these, U.S. political culture could and did 
become an argument culture, placing its bet on the processes of reason-giving and 
justification. And at different moments, other cultures will do the same. Our task as 
argumentation scholars is to appreciate such moments and to try to enlarge their 
frequency and scope. We also must recognize that, especially in our multicultural but 
atomized world, many different argument cultures may be functioning at once. 
Translating among them is a tall order, but the concepts and terminology of 
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argumentation theory may themselves form a kind of common currency. By doing what 
we do—all the different things we do—we may not only understand but also help to build 
argument cultures, cultures in which the practice of argument is welcomed and prized.  
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